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Abstract
We present evidence against the standard assumptions that social preferences are stable
and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. Researchers often measure social
preferences by posing dictator type allocation decisions. The Social Value Orientation
(SVO) is a particular sequence of dictator decisions. We vary the order in which the SVO
and a lager stakes dictator game are presented. In our rst study, we nd that prosocial
subjects act even more prosocially when the SVO is administered rst, whereas selsh
subjects are una¤ected by the order. In our second study, we vary the order of the SVO
and a nonstandard dictator game. We do not nd the e¤ect found in the rst study. This
suggests that the rst result is driven by choices involving the size of surplus. Although
we cannot determine whether the timing a¤ects preferences or the measure of preferences,
our results are incompatible with the assumptions that social preferences are stable and
can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that subjects have stable preferences over outcomes. It is also com-
monly assumed that standard techniques to measure these preferences are reliable and can be
performed in a nonintrusive manner. If these two assumptions hold, then the order in which
we perform the measurement of preferences should not matter. However, we present evidence
which challenges these assumptions.
It is signicant if a systematic violation of these assumptions is found. Measures of pref-
erences are of interest primarily because they are helpful in making predictions regarding
behavior. However, if the outcome of a measurement can a¤ect future outcomes, either be-
cause preferences are not stable or the measure is not reliable, then the value of the measure
is diminished.
In order to substantiate the claim that the timing of the measurement can a¤ect future
outcomes, one might be tempted to measure preferences and have the subjects play a strategic
game (for instance, the prisoners dilemma) but vary the order in which the items are presented
to the subject. However, if the experimenter detected that the relationship between the
measure and behavior in the game is a¤ected by the order in which the items are given,
this di¤erence is not exclusively attributable to the timing of the measure. This is because
behavior in a strategic game is not exclusively a function of preferences but also, for instance,
expectations regarding the behavior of others. Therefore, rather than directing subjects to
play a strategic game, we o¤er two nearly identical measures of preferences, and vary the order
in which they are presented to the subjects. By doing this, we are condent that the e¤ects
which we nd are not due to the more complicated features involved in the play of a strategic
game.
It has been known for some time that many subjects do not simply maximize their own
material payo¤s.1 Specically, it is often observed that some subjects will sacrice their own
material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers
often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation
decisions, often referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of
1For an early example, see Deutsch (1958).
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hypothetical or material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. One
measurement technique is to simply pose a dictator game to a subject. Another measurement
technique, which involves a specic sequence of dictator games, is Social Value Orientation
(SVO).
In our experiment, we vary the order of the SVO and a standard, lager stakes dictator
game.2 While we nd that SVO outcomes are signicantly related to outcomes in the dictator
game, we also nd that the mapping between these outcomes are related to the order in which
they are given. Specically, we nd that the subjects, for whom the SVO indicates prosocial
preferences, act even more prosocially in the larger stakes dictator game when the SVO is
administered rst. By contrast, we nd that the subjects for whom SVO indicates selsh
preferences are una¤ected by the order.
To help identify possible causes of the above result, we run another study identical to the
rst, with the exception that the dictator game exhibits a relative price of each allocation of 1
to 3, rather than the standard 1 to 1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject reduces
the recipients payo¤s by $1.50. In this case, we nd no signicant di¤erence between the
prosocials who complete the SVO before the dictator game and the prosocials who complete
the SVO after the dictator game. This suggests that decisions involving the creation of surplus
in the measurement of SVO are important to the endogeneity found in the prosocials of the
rst study.
Given the results of our experiment, we are unable to distinguish between whether the
measurement a¤ects the social preferences of the subject or whether the measure a¤ects the
subsequent performance of another measure. Although we cannot distinguish between these
two explanations, we can conclude that, given the assumptions commonly applied to exper-
iments, we should not observe the behavior found in this experiment. Further, as we have
uncovered a systematic relationship between the treatment, the action of the subjects and the
measure, we describe our results as endogenous rather than merely unstable.
The results of our experiment also suggest that the dictator game, without the creation
or destruction of surplus, seems to be more reliable and less intrusive than measures which
2For more on dictator games, see Forsythe et. al. (1994), Ho¤man et. al. (1994), Eckel and Grossman
(1996), Ru­ e (1998) and Bolton et. al. (1998).
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create or destroy surplus. Perhaps most importantly, our results suggest that measuring
social preferences before observing behavior might induce greater heterogeneity in subsequent
behavior than that which would have occurred if the measurement had not been made.
1.1 Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We use SVO because it is relatively easy to administer and interpret. The specic technique
which we use, adapted from Van Lange et. al. (1997), consists of 9 items with three possible
choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and another subject.3 Each of the
nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competitive response.
The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are
the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the subject
neither positively nor negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The
prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the
subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response
suggests that the subject positively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s
accruing to the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the
competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the
other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of u(xown; xother) where xown
is the material payo¤ accruing to self and xother is the material payo¤ accruing to another
person. A prosocial choice indicates that @u@xother > 0, an individualistic choice suggests that
@u
@xother
= 0 and a competitive choice suggests that @u@xother < 0.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance, Bogaert et. al. (2008)
suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968), SVO
has been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However,
recent work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby
a less than perfectly stable measure. Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of
SVO can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et. al. (2003) show that priming
3See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items which we use.
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certain types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior.4 While SVO
is considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that outcomes of
SVO can be a¤ected by the timing of its administration.
It is obviously problematic that the timing of the measurement of preferences might a¤ect
the relationship between the measure and behavior related to the measure. A measure is
primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis for making predictions about behavior.5
When behavior and the measure of preferences are functions not exclusively of preferences
then the usefulness of the measure is somewhat degraded.
SVO also appears in the economics literature.6 However each of these papers uses the
ring measure (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973), which is slightly di¤erent than the technique
which we use. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with 3
responses.7 However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is
to classify subjects as one of a few types. Relatively little is known about the relationship
between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et. al., 2008). However,
we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and, in our opinion, is more transparent.
As a result of these characteristics, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we nd here would
only be strengthened by using the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that
it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would
be made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains
possible that the subject would anticipate some reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar
to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation
involving self and another dictator. This other dictator does not decide on an allocation
involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
4Also see Au and Kwong (2004) and Hertel and Fiedler (1994, 1998).
5SVO has been used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et. al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos,
2001), the decision to use public transportation (Van Vugt et. al., 1996), proenvironmental behavior (Cameron
et. al., 1998; Joireman et. al., 2001) and volunteerism (McClintock and Allison, 1989).
6See Buckley et. al. (2001), Buckley et. al. (2003), Burlando and Guala (2005), Carpenter (2003),
Carpenter (2005), Cornelissen et. al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et. al. (2009) and O¤erman et. al. (1996).
7Sonnemans et. al. (2006) uses a visual representation of the ring whereby the subject selects their location
on the ring with a single click rather than responding to 24 items.
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1.2 Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique was developed by Andreoni
and Miller (2002). SVO is similar to this technique in that both techniques pose a series of
dictator games however there remain important di¤erences. In Andreoni and Miller, choice is
much less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas
in Andreoni and Miller each item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As
a result, Andreoni and Miller yields less coarse data than does SVO. However, the choice in
Andreoni and Miller is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material
allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of
SVO and that proposed by Andreoni and Miller.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the specic form of social
preferences8 related to relative wealth and reciprocity. The nature of the social preferences
might depend on whether others payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subjects own
payo¤s, therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO
the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to self are never less than
that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness and
Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
1.3 Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Consider the relationship between our paper and research on endogenous social preferences.
For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et. al. (2008) investigate how the strategic en-
vironment can a¤ect preferences.9 Also, Guth et. al. (2008) nd that subjects who contribute
more in a public goods game are signicantly more trusting in a subsequent investment game.
By contrast, we study whether the decision in a commonly used measure of social preferences
can a¤ect the outcome of a subsequent measure of social preferences. Further, as we nd a
systematic relationship, in our view the results are best described as endogenous.
8Chen and Li (2009) perform a similar type of analysis when considering the type, or identity, of the other
subject.
9Schotter et. al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of framing on judgements of fairness and is therefore related
to endogenous preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2005) nd that a strong identity manipulation can induce
more cooperation in public goods game. Also, see Bowles (1998) and Poulsen and Poulsen (2006) for more on
endogenous preferences.
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There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play
in games. For instance, Bednar et. al. (2010) describe an experiment in which subjects simul-
taneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors nd that behavior
in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game.10 This literature contends that
strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite that the games
should be played independently. The authors examine these behavioral spillovers but, unlike
the present paper, they do not directly measure preferences.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview
We seek to test whether outcomes in a measure of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent
measurements. Therefore, we direct subjects to complete the SVO and make an allocation in
a standard dictator game, however we vary the order in which these are given to the subjects.
2.2 Procedure
A total of 96 students enrolled in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United
States participated. Study 1 was conducted in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12, and 8 subjects. The
responses were entered on paper. The subjects were given course credit for attendance and
were told that that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount
earned in the experiment. The subjects completed the SVO and decided on an allocation in
a standard $10 dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not
keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the SVO and dictator game, the status of
You, Other1 and Other2 remained xed. This description of the triadic design was provided
10Also see Bednar and Page (2007), Crawford and Broseta (1998) and Van Hyuck et. al. (1993).
7
verbally by the same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject. The exact
form of the written instructions are provided in the appendix.
The SVO entailed the exact nine items from Van Lange et. al. (1997). The subjects were
presented with three items on each of three pages. In Van Lange et. al., the subjects decide on
an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our experiment
subjects are o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is e¤ectively
deciding on an allocation of a small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items, the subject
could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items, the subject
could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not told these
amounts, however they could be easily calculated. The exact items and the conversion from
points to money in the SVO are given in the appendix. The dictator game was presented to the
subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator
game allocations they most preferred. The exact form of the dictator game is provided in
the appendix in order to illustrate that it is unlikely that there was any confusion about the
allocation in the dictator game.
Within each of the 5 classes, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items
then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approxi-
mately half of each class responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We
refer to this treatment as SVO Last. Note that there is no feedback in this experiment. Each
subject completes the experiment without knowing what the other subjects have selected.
2.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects, which is the sum of the amount kept in the
SVO and the amount kept in the dictator game, ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $7.09. The total amount accruing to the subjects, which is the sum of what was kept by
the subject and what was sent by Other2, ranged from $2.51 to $21.93, with an average of
$11.69.
Using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 32 subjects (33%) as
prosocials, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There
were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6
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choices of a particular type. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to
SVO categorization and the treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 14 24 3 8 49
SVO Last 18 15 2 12 47
Total 32 39 5 20 96
Table 1: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
See Figure 1 for the distribution of amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO Last or
SVO First treatments.11 The gure is arranged by the rst digit of the amount kept in the
dictator game.
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Figure 1: Distribution of amount kept in dictator game by SVO First and SVO Last
treatment.
As one would expect, there is a signicant relationship between choice in the SVO and choice
in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 4:68; SD = 1:60) kept signicantly
less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 7:28; SD = 2:48),
11See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Cox and Sadiraj (2011) for other papers with dictator game choices in
which some subjects kept less than 50%.
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t(74) = 5:19; p < 0:01.12 While unclassied subjects (M = 5:75; SD = 3:19) kept less than
proself subjects, t(62) = 2:09; p = 0:020 and prosocial subjects kept less than unclassied
subjects, t(50) = 1:61; p = 0:057.
An SVO measure equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a
measure of 6, 7, or 8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 2 for
the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and consistency.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 4:31 7:95
(1:69) (2:12)
SVO of 6; 7; or 8 5:78 6:12
(0:53) (2:11)
Table 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
consistency of measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 (24 subjects) kept a
signicantly smaller share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(30) = 2:41; p = 0:01. Also,
among those classied as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 (26 subjects) kept
a signicantly larger share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(37) = 2:55; p < 0:001.
Therefore, we are reasonably condent of the relationship between choice in the SVO and
choice in the dictator game.
We now compare dictator allocations given the treatment. First, the di¤erence between
the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (M = $6:04; SD = 2:89) and in the SVO Last
treatment (M = $6:16; SD = 2:40) is not signicant, t(94) = 0:23; p = 0:41. However, a
signicant relationship emerges when one looks within SVO classications. See Figure 2 and
Table 3 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
12 In this paper, all given p-values are for one tail tests.
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Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 4:14 7:38
(2:28) (2:23)
SVO Last 5:10 7:28
(0:54) (2:40)
Table 3 Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treat-
ment with standard deviation in parentheses
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Figure 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
treatment
Although the individualists in the SVO First treatment do not keep a signicantly di¤erent
amount than the individualists in the SVO Last treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence
within the prosocial subjects. Prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep less than
the prosocials in the SVO Last treatment, t(30) = 1:72; p = 0:048.
This relationship becomes even more signicant when one restricts attention to those with
a consistent SVO measure. The prosocials who had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO Last
treatment (M = 4:89; SD = 0:30) kept signicantly more than the prosocials who had an
SVO score of 9 in the SVO First treatment (M = 3:64; SD = 2:34), t(22) = 1:92; p = 0:034.
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3 Study 2
3.1 Overview
Roughly speaking, Study 1 nds that prosocial subjects act even more prosocially in the dic-
tator game when the SVO items are administered rst, whereas selsh subjects are una¤ected
by the order of the SVO. Based on the data available from Study 1, it is not clear to us
what drives this result. As there is no choice involving the creation of surplus in the standard
dictator game, it is possible that the creation of surplus by the prosocial subjects in the SVO
First treatment predisposes them to be more generous in the dictator game than comparable
prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. Therefore, if the dictator game was designed in a man-
ner in which choice decided the amount of surplus then the results in the SVO Last treatment
might converge to that of the SVO First treatment. However, it is also possible that with the
standard dictator game, being selsh is too easy and so the individualists are not a¤ected by
the timing. Therefore, if the dictator game is designed in a manner in which being selsh is
more costly then we expect a divergence of the results of the SVO First and Last treatments
of the individualists. In Study 2, we hope to to shed some light on the relative merit of these
two explanations.
Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using
a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation price is 1
to 3. In other words, the most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most
generous allocation is $0 to self and $30 to other. This nonstandard dictator game has the
advantages that the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and being selsh is relatively
more costly. If we nd that the timing has a reduced inuence on the prosocials then we favor
the former explanation. If we nd that individualists are now a¤ected by the timing then we
will favor the latter explanation.
3.2 Procedure
A total of 90 students in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States
participated. Study 2 was conducted in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects. The procedures
in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game.
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Rather than the standard dictator game in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other
payo¤s is 1 to 1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1 to 3. In other words,
to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other
subject by $1.50. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other
subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which
of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred. The exact form of the dictator game
is provided in the appendix.
3.3 Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average
of $8.17. The total amount accruing to the subjects ranged from $1.13 to $42.00, with an
average of $17.36.
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 44 subjects (49%)
as prosocials, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There
were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices
of a particular type. Table 4 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO
categorization and the treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 21 16 2 5 44
SVO Last 23 18 2 3 46
Total 44 34 4 8 90
Table 4: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and treatment
See Figure 3 for the distribution of amounts kept in the dictator game by SVO Last or
SVO First treatments. The gure is arranged by the rst digit of the amount kept in the
dictator game.
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Figure 3: Distribution of subjects and amount kept in dictator game by SVO First or SVO
Last treatments.
Similar to Study 1, we nd a signicant relationship between choice in the SVO and
choice in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 6:44; SD = 2:79) kept signicantly
less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 8:28; SD = 2:33),
t(76) = 2:86; p < 0:01. As in Study 1, we nd that the consistency of the SVO is related to
the choice in the dictator game. See Table 5 for the amount kept across both treatments by
the consistency of the SVO.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO of 9 5:97 8:38
(3:11) (2:37)
SVO of 6; 7, or 8 7:46 7:94
(1:57) (2:53)
Table 5: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
consistency of measurement with standard deviation in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (30 subjects) kept a
signicantly smaller share than subjects with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(42) = 1:70; p = 0:049.
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However, in contrast to Study 1, among those classied as individualistic, subjects with a
measure equal to 9 (17 subjects) did not keep a signicantly di¤erent amount than subjects
with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(32) = 0:52; p = 0:30.
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. See Table
6 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 5:98 8:00
(3:18) (2:54)
SVO Last 6:87 8:31
(2:36) (2:38)
Table 6: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and
treatment with standard deviation in parentheses
Although the prosocials in the SVO First treatment kept less than the prosocials in the
SVO Last treatment, this di¤erence is not signicant, t(42) = 1:06; p = 0:147. However, as
in Study 1, there is no signicant di¤erence in the amount kept by individualists in the SVO
First and SVO Last treatments, t(32) = 0:361; p = 0:360.
The timing remains insignicant among the prosocials even when attention is restricted
to subjects with perfectly consistent SVO measures. The prosocials who had an SVO score
of 9 in the SVO Last treatment (M = 6:4333; SD = 2:78) kept more than the prosocials who
had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO First Treatment (M = 5:50; SD = 3:43), however this
relationship is not signicant, t(28) = 0:82; p = 0:21.
4 Discussion
In Study 1 we found that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep signicantly
less in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. In Study 2 we
found that there is no signicant di¤erence between the SVO First and SVO Last treatments
for either prosocials or individualists. From this we infer that the results in Study 1 are driven
by the presence of choices involving the creation of surplus, as the choice of the size of surplus
is present in both stages of Study 2 but only one stage in Study 1.
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5 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through choice
in the Social Value Orientation (SVO) and choice in a dictator game. In Study 1, we vary the
order of the SVO and a standard dictator game. We nd evidence that subjects with prosocial
preferences act more generously in the dictator game when the SVO items are given rst. On
the other hand, our evidence suggests that subjects with individualistic preferences are not
a¤ected by the order of the items. This result calls into question the assumption that social
preferences are stable and that they can be measured in a reliable and nonintrusive manner.
To gain insights on the explanation for the main result in Study 1, Study 2 performs
the identical procedure of Study 1 with the exception that a nonstandard dictator game
is used. This nonstandard dictator game exhibits a 1 to 3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s
and other payo¤s, whereas the standard dictator game has a 1 to 1 trade-o¤. We nd no
signicant di¤erence between those making dictator game decisions before SVO and those
making dictator game decisions after SVO, for prosocials or individualists. Study 2 suggests
that the main result of Study 1 is driven by the presence of decisions regarding the size of the
surplus. This creation of surplus, which seems to only inuence the prosocials, is absent in
the standard dictator game.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance,
we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects the dictator game choices, the
dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Such questions of endo-
geneity are notoriously tricky and would require further study. It is also unclear if the timing
matters in the measurement of preferences via Andreoni-Miller, Charness-Rabin, or Chen-Li
techniques. Also, we are unable to determine whether the relationship between behavior and
the measure of social preferences is fundamentally less malleable than the relationship for
prosocials or whether this is a result of the experimental design. For instance, the optimal
choice of many individualists involves a corner solution at the most selsh allocation. In
this case, it is possible that we would be unable to detect the inuence of the timing of the
measurement for these selsh subjects, whereas if their choice was interior their relationship
would be found to be as the prosocials. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences when
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the subject receives a larger share than the other subject. The signicance of this detail is not
clear. Hopefully, future work will shed light on these issues.
What are we to make of the results? Our results suggest that use of a measure which does
not create or destroy surplus, might measure preferences in a less intrusive manner than would
a measure involving surplus. Also, our results suggest that measuring social preferences before
observing behavior might induce greater heterogeneity in behavior than we would observe had
the measure not been given.
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6 Appendix
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et. al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a competitive answer, a individualistic answer and a
competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to
$0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et. al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are answered according to the above.
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Instructions given to each subject:
19
Study 1 Dictator Game:
20
Study 2 Dictator Game:
21
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